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1. Introduction 
The 2015 Paris Agreement and the recent Quito New Urban Agenda 
both emphasised the need to empower cities in climate change policies, 
including energy policies that aim at energy transitions towards more 
energy efficiency and the use of renewable energies. 
This call is often justified by the fact that cities now house more than 
half of the global population and are responsible for more than 75% 
of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Economic activities and wealth 
are also mainly concentrated in cities. In addition, many studies point 
to the increased vulnerability of cities because of the rise in urban 
temperatures, which could make summer life in many Arab cities 
unbearable. Rising sea levels are also expected to threaten a number of 
maritime cities, among them many Arab capitals and large cities. Being 
both factors in and potential victims of climate change, cities have many 
reasons to act. Therefore, there is a need to examine how changes in 
urban governance could indeed address this necessity and the challenge 
cities have to face.
This issue has been addressed in many studies and plans for cities in 
the Western and advanced industrial world. These cities have not only 
undertaken various initiatives and implemented projects, they have 
also embarked on new diplomatic actions, creating networks such as 
the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives, or more 
recently the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, which the mayor of 
Paris, Anne Hidalgo, currently leads. Its aim is to promote policies and 
share experiences and technological and administrative tools. Urban 
governance change is needed, not just new technologies. 
Hodson and Marvin (2010) began to examine this issue in the case of world 
cities like London, San Francisco and New York a few years ago. They have 
insisted on several points: Firstly, instead of considering only climate change 
issues, they stressed the need to understand ecological pressures more 
widely, particularly the way global energy pressures, like peak oil threats 
or price increases have created energy stress for cities. Secondly, they also 
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underlined how privatisation trends and the ascent of transnational energy 
firms reconfigured energy regulation by sidelining public energy utilities 
and companies. Thirdly, metropolisation, the concentration of wealth and 
power in the big metropolises, transforms urban governance. The role of 
states in energy regulation is thus undermined and metropolitan coalitions 
are more diverse and open to private and as well as local urban interests. 
Green growth becomes a new market for private firms, and metropolitan 
governments compete for jobs and investments in the sector. At the same 
time, ensuring the continuity of energy supply or of other infrastructure 
is another goal for metropolitan firms and authorities. This leads to new 
agendas, including local policies of energy transition, which combine 
the promotion of renewable energies and energy efficiency with the 
shortening of energy circuits. 
However, several factors that are favouring these changes in energy 
governance seem to be specific to world cities and might not 
apply in other contexts. The increasing – albeit contested – political 
autonomisation of such cities in their relation to national states and their 
specific wealth are cases in point.
My goal in this chapter is to look at Arab cities, for which, at a first 
glance, energy transition initiatives seem difficult to identify. If we look 
at the map of the C40 network, we observe that only three Arab cities 
form part of it: Cairo, Amman and Dubai. Out of more than 1500 
members, the ICLEI network of Local Governments for Sustainability 
includes only ten from the Middle East and North Africa, five of them 
being Turkish. As for the Organization of Islamic Capital and Cities, 
which brings together 141 cities, its goals barely mention environmental 
and sustainable development issues and the network seems to be 
asleep.1 All of this suggests that metropolitan energy and environment 
initiatives do not abound in this region of the world. The objective here 
is to understand why.
My chapter draws on a wide collective analysis of urban energy 
transition policies in ten metropolises from emerging economies, 
including several Arab cities such as Amman, Beirut, Tunis and Sfax 
(Jaglin and Verdeil, 2017; Verdeil et al., 2015; Verdeil, 2014a; 2016; 
forthcoming), and on secondary literature about the United Arab 
Emirates. It aims to propose some preliminary observations and to raise 
questions to fuel the upcoming debate. I will not present case studies 
but rather identify policy issues and policy options that vary greatly 
according to context and, above all, according to the national availability 
of fossil energy such as oil and gas and the social contracts that govern 
the redistribution of this wealth in exchange for loyalty. 
2. Global energy pressures rather than climate 
change
Changes in energy supply emerge as a primary concern for MENA 
governments. By comparison, other ecological pressures trail behind, 
such as increased threats of flooding because of exceptional rainfalls 
and sea-level rise or hotter temperature prospects, which have recently 
made the headlines in Gulf cities. However, this concern takes a 
different form in energy exporting and importing countries. In oil and 
1. See: http://www.c40.org/cities; http://
www.iclei.org/iclei-members/iclei-
members.html?memberlistRegion=N
orth+Africa%2C+Middle+East%2C+
West+Asia; http://www.oicc.org/ 
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gas-producing countries, threats of peak oil and resource depletion are 
surfacing in some cases, such as in Bahrain, Dubai or Tunisia. However, 
in most cases, it’s not the depletion by itself that is a concern, but rather 
the fact that growth in demand consumes more and more of national 
oil production, which then cannot be sold on the international market. 
This results in reduced incomes, which in turn compromise the ability 
to finance the redistribution that is at the heart of the social contract. 
Lower oil prices since 2014 have aggravated this situation. 
Net oil and gas importers in the MENA region experience energy 
pressures in a different way. In a context of growing demand for energy 
driven by population growth and the rise of middle class consumption 
patterns (individual cars, electric appliances) the hikes in energy prices 
at the end of the 2000s strongly inflated energy spending and created 
fiscal tensions, as higher energy costs have not been passed on to the 
prices of essential goods. Low oil prices after 2014 were a relief for 
governments in net importing countries.
It is noteworthy that both energy poor and, more surprisingly, energy 
rich countries have experienced recurring electricity shortages in the 
last decade, sometimes for long periods (as in Lebanon). In a context 
of rising demand and new uses, power cuts are the symbol of the 
vulnerability of energy systems in the region and prompt strong calls 
for improved energy supply. Hence, policies of securitisation and 
diversification are topping the energy agendas, as will be discussed in 
the last section.
In contrast to the world cities mentioned earlier, climate change 
concerns are much less visible in these countries and barely motivate 
policy discourse. As in many emerging and developing countries, this 
issue is not central in political agendas. There are several reasons for 
this. Firstly, in Arab countries green parties barely exist. Environmental 
movements may mobilise people, but normally around local or national 
stakes (pollution, land-use conflicts) rather than global ones (Karam, 
2006). Global threats such as climate change and energy transition 
investments are understood as a consequence of colonialism or as neo-
colonialist avatars and therefore as threats to national sovereignty (de 
Souza et al., 2018). In addition, national and metropolitan governments 
have often manipulated environmental policies to attract international 
capital without implementing them seriously or only to advance private 
interests – as in Tunisia or in Syria – thus undermining the credibility of 
new claims in the eyes of local environmentalists (Barthel, Clerc and 
Philifert, 2013).
3. Centralised vs metropolitan governance of 
energy regulation
The specificity of metropolitan governance in most Arab countries is also 
worth unpacking, as it highlights the differences between Arab cities 
and the trends that Hodson and Marvin describe. Because of colonial 
legacy, post-independence state-building policies and authoritarian 
regimes, cities and, even more so, metropolises and capital cities 
often remain under the rather strict tutelage of national governments 
(United Cities and Local Governments, 2008; Harb and Atallah, 2015). 
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Consequently, metropolitan authorities have little political autonomy 
and lack financial and human resources. Implementing innovative 
policies seem largely out of the scope of their agendas. Egypt is a case in 
point, hence the surprise to find Cairo within the C40 network, because 
its governor, acting on behalf of the government, hardly follows an 
autonomous agenda. 
Amman briefly offered a counterexample with its Green Growth Policy 
at the end of the 2000s under Mayor Maani. But the experience, 
supported and funded by the World Bank, was soon terminated by 
the government as it appeared that allegations of corruption and the 
influence of foreign consultants and funders provided the king with an 
easy scapegoat in the face of mounting protests associated with the 
Arab Spring and energy tariffs (Verdeil, 2014b).
The so-called city-states of the Gulf region differ from other Arab 
metropolises. Dubai, Doha, Kuwait, Bahrain and Abu Dhabi implement 
energy policies that are de facto metropolitan but at the same time 
national or quasi-national. This specific configuration is one of the rare 
contexts where innovative energy initiatives unfold, and requires further 
scrutiny.
Centralised state governance is even stronger when it comes to energy. 
In the Arab world perhaps more than elsewhere, energy (and oil above 
all) belongs to the sovereignty of the state. Hence, opening this sector 
up to privatisation and foreign investments is a sensitive issue that 
governments have carefully monitored. In the case of electricity, Arab 
countries have been reluctant to embrace privatisation, in contrast 
to global trends, which show that this sector has widely opened to 
public-private partnerships (PPPs) (Somma and Rubino, 2016). When 
this has happened in the Arab world, it has been partial and prudent. 
Investments in electricity have been limited to specific segments of the 
market, such as renewable energies. But governments have avoided 
wider privatisation of electricity utilities, especially of the distribution 
segment. Jordan, again, can be seen as an outlier, as private investors 
now control both generation and distribution there. In most other 
countries, privatisation of electricity remains a red flag, such as in 
Tunisia. In any case, state utilities still control the transmissions according 
to the model of the single buyer (meaning that direct purchases of 
power by final customers are not possible).
The states remain everywhere in charge of regulation issues, such as fixing 
the energy tariffs for electricity, gas, gasoline and diesel. In some cases, 
supposedly independent regulatory committees have taken over. However, 
their independence remains theoretical. In Jordan, for instance, between 
2008 and 2014, the same engineer has successively occupied high-ranking 
positions in electricity firms and the regulatory committee before becoming 
minister of energy, contradicting the separation of these positions that the 
theory of the principal and agent requires.
In the Arab world governments have kept hold of the steering wheel, 
in contrast to the governance changes that have affected the energy 
systems in many other countries, especially in the West. Metropolitan 
entities in the MENA countries generally have little power and this is 
paramount when it comes to energy issues.
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4. Three policy options and political issues
This section describes three kinds of policy in the field of energy. I show 
that governments increasingly worry about what one can label an urban 
energy question. However, if it is possible to speak of an urbanisation 
of energy issues, nowhere can one observe a territorialisation of energy 
regulation at infra-statal scale similar to the metropolitanisation that 
happens in the world cities mentioned previously. 
Securitisation
Governments have considered energy security a major concern for a 
long time, above all in relation to geopolitical troubles at the regional 
scale. Conflicts over energy transportation in and from the region, 
by ships or pipelines, regularly make the headlines. However, a series 
of independent events have concurred in shifting attention from the 
national supply to the supply of metropolitan areas.
In the Gulf countries, the end of the 2000s witnessed a frenzy of 
urban development and at the same time alarming electricity shortages 
resulting from the lack of power generation that left new buildings 
without grid connection for months if not years. Hence, they needed 
to run their own generators. It is well know that Baghdad and other 
Iraqi cities, as well as their Lebanese counterparts, have experienced 
daily rolling power cuts for many years because of bad management 
and reconstruction policy failures (Verdeil, 2016). Popular protests 
against the governments’ mismanagement of electricity multiplied, 
even though they never coalesced into threats against the regimes. In 
Egypt, however, energy shortages, both of electricity and natural gas, 
fuelled popular protests. Many rumours have circulated that the military 
aggravated the magnitude of those shortages in order to increase unrest 
and mobilisations against the Morsi government in the spring of 2013 
(Lakhal, 2014). In Tunisia, a blackout in September 2014, days before the 
elections, triggered rumours and fears. 
In all these contexts, power cuts may be related to diverse failures in 
energy systems, bad management and corruption. However, growing 
demand from energy users, both households and companies, is another 
reason. In Abu Dhabi, for instance, air conditioning represented 57.5% 
of residential electricity consumption in 2016 (IRENA, 2016: 33). 
This use in on the rise everywhere. In Tunisia, STEG, the electricity 
utility, circulated figures showing that 37% of households relied on air 
conditioning in 2014. Other electrical appliances also contribute to the 
growing demand, not to mention industry and services sectors that 
develop because of policies of economic diversification, particularly in 
the Gulf.
The lack of reliable electricity has economic consequences, pushing firms 
and private actors’ representatives to lobby governments in order to 
reform and improve electrical output. The concern for energy security 
is not in itself much different from what is seen in other contexts. 
Governments respond by diversifying their energy resources and 
technologies to mitigate their dependency on existing energy systems 
dominated by fossil energy.
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Diversification
The diversification of energy mixes in the Arab region is not a response 
to calls for climate change mitigation and a shift to low carbon energy 
systems. This is not to say that renewable energy projects have not 
increased recently. But in contrast to European countries where this 
is motivated by climate change objectives and, at a second level, as a 
policy to strengthen new industrial sectors, in the Arab world this 
recent push is mostly market-led and follows the rapid fall in prices 
of solar panels and other devices. This shift has been long in the 
making, but remains modest until now. Morocco, Jordan and the 
UAE are its frontrunners.
More striking have been the moves toward more intensive use of 
grid-based natural gas, for instance in urban networks in Egypt and 
Tunisia. A major reason advanced by governments and development 
institutions that are funding these investments is the need to slash 
subsidies associated with the use of gas canisters (Verdeil et al., 2015). 
With these measures governments seek to promote more efficient use 
of energy and to save public spending. Tunisia has managed to curb 
energy consumption growth in the wake of their implementation. Other 
countries seek to diversify energy sources. In Jordan, the government 
launched the development of its oil shale deposits, using technologies 
developed by an Estonian company with Chinese funding, which 
will provide base-load capacity at a cheaper price than diesel-based 
generation. The objective is to raise oil-shale-based electricity generation 
to 14% of Jordan’s electricity mix in 2020.
MENA programmes to develop nuclear power plants also illustrate a will 
to secure base-load generation capacity that prevents the burning of oil 
or gas, despite the financial burdens and the technical challenges for 
small and capital-poor countries. In Abu Dhabi a nuclear power plant 
is already under construction. In Jordan and Egypt, governments chase 
investments from Russia and China to reach their objectives. A pre-deal 
was struck with Rosatom in 2012 in Jordan, but securing the funding 
has proven difficult and no final deal has been reached yet, despite 
continuing negotiations. In Egypt, the government plans to launch a 
nuclear plant in 2029 with 85% Russian funding.
In this context, energy transition takes on a very different meaning, 
as the paths followed are very different from those of Western 
countries. Environmental motivations are hardly found in the Arab 
contexts. Promoting a green growth agenda, as in Western or 
East Asian metropolises, in order to favour the development of 
local energy champions, is a strategy that Abu Dhabi has followed 
in developing solar technologies with Masdar City and the new 
Shams power plants complex. Saudi Arabia seeks to emulate this 
strategy with urban projects such as the Neom city development 
in the northwest of the country. Elsewhere, energy projects mainly 
rely on foreign investments. Governments display ambitious 
plans, but national companies lack expertise and capital. Plans to 
develop green urbanism or smart cities remain rather anecdotal and 
underfunded (Barthel, 2016). Beyond a few attempts, urban green 
capitalism has not found a path to Arab cities.
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The urban politicisation of tariffs
Energy governance is becoming a new concern in world cities and in 
the West. However, the lack of powers for mayors in Arab cities and 
the shyness of green capitalism put limits on energy governance there. 
One cannot speak of any territorialisation of energy governance, i.e. 
the emergence of locally driven energy policies. However, interrupted or 
expensive access to energy represents a political threat, leading to angry 
street protests against power cuts and tariff hikes, as already mentioned 
with the cases of Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia (Lakhal, 2014; Verdeil, 
2014a). The politicisation of energy tariffs has therefore become a major 
element that affects energy governance in the major cities. This is why I 
proposed to speak of an urbanisation of energy governance. 
The existing tariffs on energy for transportation, cooking gas and 
electricity remain highly subsidised. This mirrors both the social contracts 
by which governments have sought to exchange loyalty for access to 
modern standards of life and the reliance of current energy systems 
on fossil-fuel technologies that have experienced strong variations in 
prices since the end of the 2000s. In addition, the so-called Arab Spring 
protests have temporarily blocked governments’ attempts at reforming 
the pricing systems. 
In Jordan, Tunisia and Egypt many studies have shown the biases 
associated with energy subsidies. A large part of the subsidies is 
captured by the wealthiest segments of the population, because the 
middle and upper classes use individual mobility much more than 
lower-income classes (Sdralevich, 2014). The same goes for electricity, 
where the first blocks of progressive tariffs subsidise consumption 
of every category of the population, regardless of income. The first 
announcements of tariff reforms triggered important mobilisations 
during the years 2011–2013 in major cities in Jordan and Tunisia. 
They quickly convinced governments to give up or delay the reforms. 
Eventually, tariff hikes were implemented more gradually, in a more 
prudent way, either by exempting many users from paying more, or 
by implementing systems of cash transfers, as in Jordan for gasoline 
for instance. However, even if energy subsidies have decreased they 
remain a sensitive issue, with a tension between social justice and fiscal 
efficiency (El-Katiri and Fattouh, 2017).
The case of energy-producing countries is a bit different. The fiscal burden 
of low price or almost-free energy access has been felt more strongly since 
the recent drop in energy prices, which have reduced states’ incomes. 
Therefore, tariff hikes have begun to be implemented, affecting foreign 
residents more heavily than nationals. Despite this move, hailed by 
international financial institutions such as the IMF, the money spent on 
subsidies remains a huge burden and is still inefficiently targeted. Any 
move seems difficult in a context of intense power struggles, such as in 
Saudi Arabia (Moerenhout, Vezanis and Westling, 2017).
The politicisation of energy tariffs highlights the increasingly urban 
standards of life that favour higher energy demand. This also points to 
the potential political power of urban masses that governments have 
learned to fear in the last decade. In this respect, energy has become an 
urban issue, but one that is still governed from above.
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5. Conclusion
This chapter discussed the way the metropolises of the Arab world 
tackle energy transition challenges. Therefore, the analysis followed 
Hodson and Marvin’s analytical grid and sought to identify the 
environmental challenges these metropolises are facing, the networks of 
public policies that emerge and frame the public issues, the policies that 
are put on the agenda and the governance of energy that unfolds.
In contrast to world cities and many Western cities, we find that Arab 
metropolises do not emerge as strong autonomy-seeking powers, and 
remain under central governments’ oversight. These national and business 
elites do not care very much about global ecological pressures such as 
climate change, despite growing evidence that big cities face multiple 
threats. They are far more concerned with energy security in the face of 
shifting oil prices and growing energy demand. This is triggering policies of 
energy diversification that include renewable energies but as a minor part 
of diversified technologies that do not ban fossil solutions. Green tech and 
urban sustainable policies remain the exception: only very rich oil exporting 
countries have begun to consider them. However, despite the lack of 
territorialisation of energy governance at the level of cities, energy issues 
are more and more discussed in cities. They trigger social mobilisations that 
have proved powerful and prompted governments to consider cities as a 
factor that matters for energy governance. 
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